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INTRODUCTION 
n this Article, I offer a provocative perspective on the future of 
affirmative action in higher education.1  Given the revolutionary 
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education2 
and Hernandez v. Texas,3 and more recent Court rulings such as 
Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter),4 Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, and Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education (collectively Parents Involved),5 I take 
issue with both sides in the current debate.  End or defend?  Neither 
side is facing reality. 
For those holding out for using race6 as a lawful consideration in 
admission and student assignment policies based on notions of 
 
∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  I would 
like to dedicate this Article in loving memory to John B. Stevens and Marcia Stevens. 
1 I do not address the role of affirmative action in employment, government contracts, 
or any other field in this Article. 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
4 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
5 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
6 In the interest of not repeating a long litany of group identifiers throughout this 
Article, I use “race” to signify not only skin color, other outward physical characteristics, 
accented voice, nationality, and ethnic background but also to signify gender, age, 
disability, sexual orientation, and any other group signifier used to abbreviate our 
humanity. 
I 
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distributive/corrective justice or other remedial justifications,7 today’s 
legal reality makes it plain that there is no life left in that defense.8  
For those looking to bury affirmative action altogether,9 all other 
realities—political, social, business, international, etc.—make it 
crystal clear that we, as a nation, dare not pretend that we have 
resolved the pernicious effects of four hundred years of invidious 
racial discrimination and cultural isolation.10 
So how do I propose to satisfy both legal demands under the U.S. 
Constitution while responding honestly to rampant, systemic racism 
in this country?  I argue that affirmative action has lost its way and 
must return to its true meaning and purpose; indeed, affirmative 
action is the only hope we have of returning to a path that is both 
acceptable by law and supportable by a vast majority of Americans.  
The way back is the way forward: allow every applicant who 
otherwise would not be admitted by the “numbers” to apply for 
special consideration in the admissions process based on a proven 
commitment to complete a clinical curriculum in law and integration 
studies.  Now is not the time to either end or defend affirmative action 
in K-12 or higher education, but instead to extend its benefits to all of 
the students prepared to help America honor its pledge of liberty and 
justice for all.  By extending the opportunity of exceptional 
educational training to every applicant ready and willing to advance 
progressive public policy negotiation and broad-based, community 
problem solving, affirmative action returns to its original purpose of 
healing America of racist wounds. 
 
7 See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Affirmative Action After Grutter: Reflections on 
a Tortured Death, Imagining a Humanity–Affirming Reincarnation, 63 LA. L. REV. 705, 
705–07 (2003). 
8 Chief Justice Roberts opined in Parents Involved, “In design and operation, the 
[student assignment] plans are directed only to racial balance . . . an objective this Court 
has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 704 (2007). 
9 E.g., L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep Its 
Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 161, 161 (2004). 
10 In the words of Justice O’Connor in Grutter, “[There is a] unique experience of being 
a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.”  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).  Therefore, “student body diversity . . . 
better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better 
prepares them as professionals . . . . [T]he skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, 
ideas, and viewpoints.”  Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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My support for affirmative action, therefore, is race-neutral.11  It 
does not matter whether the applicant is a poor Chicano12 from the 
toughest streets of Los Angeles, like me, or a rich and privileged 
white male, such as Bobby Kennedy, Jr.  The only question is 
whether applicants applying for affirmative action slots understand 
and seek to further the truth that many Americans—women and men, 
old and young, black, brown, red, yellow, and white—marched 
throughout the land to open the eyes of this country to grievous 
injury, both personal and systemic.  Affirmative action needs, more 
than ever, to recruit today’s marchers from all walks and stations of 
life, joining forces and fighting full-out, while demanding a new 
chance for all Americans to live free of bigotry and prejudice.13  Are 
today’s applicants under affirmative action, as has been the case for 
generations of past protestors, prepared to learn and do everything 
necessary to integrate American society, even if it results in the 
sacrifice of jobs, freedom, and, at times, their lives for the noble cause 
of a unified nation?14 
The goal of street protests, legal challenges, and other strategies to 
end racial discrimination—what I call the March for Freedom—has 
never been that applicants would someday check off an ill-fitting box 
on an application indicating racial background and, on that basis 
alone, would qualify for preferential admissions or placement 
policies.15  Rather than this stunted version of the agenda, civil rights 
activists sought true inclusion and the building of a new nation.  
 
11 See generally Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative 
Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2001) (arguing for a race-neutral approach to affirmative 
action that investigates the applicant’s experience with racial discrimination, the likelihood 
that the applicant would contribute an underrepresented viewpoint on race issues, and 
whether the applicant would provide resources to underserved communities). 
12 “Chicano” is a chosen term of self-identification.  For me, it denotes a community 
activist of Mexican-American ethnic lineage with a progressive political agenda of 
eradicating oppression and promoting inclusion. 
13 Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology 
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 255 (2005) (“The civil rights 
movement ultimately succeeded not only because it had moral force, but also because [of] 
a powerful, well-organized grassroots effort . . . .”). 
14 As Justice O’Connor wrote in Grutter, “Effective participation by members of all 
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one 
Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
15 Today’s applicant is increasingly of mixed race, a product of various ethnic 
bloodlines.  So what does it mean to an admissions committee that an applicant checks the 
box “Chicano/Latino” when that ethnicity is one ethnicity among many others, including 
forebears of European descent?  What does it mean that an applicant checks “African 
American” but has skin pigmentation causing the student to appear white? 
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Looking at closed doors and separate facilities, the activists demanded 
integration.  But they also had a vision: someday the rhetoric of the 
twentieth-century civil rights movement would translate into the civic 
inclusion movement of the twenty-first century.16  They looked 
forward to students of all colors being admitted to school and being 
prepared to work together to push the agenda of complete racial and 
gender equality. 
Thus, my argument is that affirmative action in admissions and 
placement policies must be strengthened, not weakened.  But for 
affirmative action to be once again legally and politically acceptable, 
it must be used to recruit and admit applicants of color, women, white 
males, and anyone else ready to take America to the next step of 
racial and gender harmony.  This next step necessitates an admissions 
policy that legally recruits affirmative action applicants whose scores 
and grade point averages may be too low for admission but who are 
prepared to redeem all aspects of their training and life experience as 
they fulfill a clinical curriculum in racial integration studies and 
practice.17  Such a policy would be consistent with the current 
treatment of athletes who are disproportionately of color and are 
recruited even if their test scores and grade point averages would 
otherwise not result in admission, admitted legacy students who are 
predominately white, musicians and thespians who are increasingly of 
all ethnic backgrounds, and so on.18 
I have another, still more powerful reason to neither defend nor 
end, but extend, affirmative action to all applicants.  Affirmative 
action, understood as described below—public policy negotiation and 
community problem solving, satisfies a compelling state interest as 
required by the U.S. Constitution.19  When affirmative action is 
 
16 See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? 62 (1967) (“I cannot see how the Negro will be totally liberated from the 
crushing weight of poor education, squalid housing and economic strangulation until he is 
integrated, with power, into every level of American life. . . . [L]iberation must come 
through integration.”). 
17 These clinical courses—a number of which would be new, others that would be a 
reworking of current offerings—would be open to all students.  This would remove the so-
called “stigmatizing” effect of affirmative action since no one would know whether white, 
black, brown, or any other classmates were affirmative action admits or not. 
18 It is expected that these admitted students will remain accountable and fulfill the 
basis of the admission decision, such as maintaining their participation in athletics or the 
performing arts. 
19 See KING, JR., supra note 16, at 100–01 (“[T]he final goal which we seek to realize 
[is] genuine intergroup and interpersonal living . . . . [and] an end to fears, prejudice, pride 
and irrationality, which are the barriers to a truly integrated society.”); see also id. at 132 
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extended, it recruits and enrolls students from all backgrounds 
committed to removing every remnant and vestige of racism and 
sexism that remains in our society.  But the role of the students does 
not stop there.  Not only do clinical courses in law and integration 
equip affirmative action students to heal the nation’s racial and gender 
wounds, this form of legal education prepares them to work with a 
cross-section of Americans on even larger questions and struggles.20  
These students turn their scholarship and problem-solving skills into a 
template for collaboration and extend that pattern to more pressing, 
encompassing issues facing the nation and humanity as a whole.21 
Today’s students, both in class and out in the field, are far more 
attuned to organic, holistic applications of their knowledge than 
previous generations.  Today’s students want to solve the immediate 
problem in their own backyard in such a way that it prepares them to 
solve for global patterns.  Baby Boomers audaciously claimed, “back 
in the day,” that they knew the one right answer to race and gender 
issues (and everything else).  Today’s students came of age as 
contributors to the accelerating worldwide conversation on the 
internet and are keenly aware of worldwide refugees and terrorism, 
international trade, and global warming.  More and more of today’s 
students are choosing interracial marriages22 and are actively 
promoting emerging connections between all members of the human 
family.23  More than attending the latest seminar on multicultural 
 
(“A final challenge that we face as a result of our great dilemma [of racial injustice] is to 
be ever mindful of enlarging the whole society, and giving it a new sense of values as we 
seek to solve our particular problem.”). 
20 See Bryan Walsh, Bring Eco-Power to the People, TIME, Dec. 3, 2007, at 95 
(reporting on the effort of Van Jones, founder of the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, 
to redefine race struggles expansively as a community effort in energy conservation, thus 
creating employment and other economic gains for people of color). 
21 See generally MARGARET J. WHEATLEY, LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW SCIENCE: 
LEARNING ABOUT ORGANIZATION FROM AN ORDERLY UNIVERSE (1992) (describing 
forces, such as the “butterfly effect,” that are at work in small changes that have an impact 
far beyond what could have been predicted). 
22 See, e.g., Associated Press, After 40 Years, Interracial Marriage Flourishing, 
MSNBC, Apr. 15, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18090277.  What was offensive to 
my Latino parents—marrying outside my race—is ho-hum stuff today.  I married a woman 
from India.  Our mixed-race daughter married a Scandinavian.  And who knows what 
partner will interest our grandkids? 
23 I like to joke with my students that when I was in law school in the late 1970s we 
used yellow legal pads to jot down notes—there was no internet, no personal computers, 
no electronic retrieval systems, no Facebook, no MySpace, and no Twitter.  I explain that 
the way we performed legal research was to take our human bodies to the shelves of the 
library and physically consult, one by one, books of a reporter series or other research 
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sensitivity, today’s students want to practice a skill set that develops 
proactive hospitality and mutual accountability among strangers and 
enemies.  What they seek, therefore, is not simply the absence of 
racism or the presence of cultural diversity, but rather the ecology of 
cultural justice.  This, more than anything else, is what the nation 
needs and why affirmative action constitutes a compelling state 
interest. 
In Part II of this Article, I describe the impact of Brown v. Board of 
Education on my own search for emergence as an American.  This is 
my post-Brown narrative: I am racialized.  I am Chicano.  I was born 
the same year that Brown ended legal segregation.  I was raised trying 
to survive drugs, gangs, and gunfire in a tough Los Angeles ghetto.  I 
had no hope that my story would be any different from millions of 
other impoverished children of immigrants.  But my life story 
changed dramatically and gained American texture through higher 
education at Yale University, legal training at the University of 
California, Berkeley, and a career as a law professor—all thanks to 
affirmative action.24 
In Part III, I examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Grutter 
and Parents Involved.  As will be seen, I agree in large part with the 
teachings of Justice O’Conner’s plurality opinion in Grutter: 
affirmative action serves the nation when it points forward, not 
backward, and prepares us all for even more difficult domestic and 
international challenges.  As explained below, affirmative action in 
the twenty-first century is no longer a remedy for past and present 
societal discrimination inflicted on certain groups, but rather it is a 
needed template for negotiating public policy, growing local 
communities, building the nation, and unifying the world. 
With regard to Parents Involved, I point out that the Supreme 
Court squandered the promise of Grutter.  Instead of following 
Grutter’s lead and promoting cultural diversity as a forward-thinking 
goal—anticipating the ecology of cultural justice—the Court in 
Parents Involved returned to old ways of thinking and perceiving.  
The Court reduced cultural diversity to divisive, zero-sum 
constructions of race disputes.  Rather than focus on race relations as 
a needed template for progressive, mutually advantageous 
negotiation, the Court fixated on static race classifications and win-
 
tomes, ever careful to check the back flap of the book for the latest updated supplement 
(which we all knew was already outdated).  They are aghast! 
24 I am proud to say that I am a product of affirmative action.  Stigma?  I wear the 
badge with honor. 
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lose confrontations.  Not surprisingly, the Court held that the only 
way that someone of color could take advantage of affirmative action 
is at a white person’s expense. 
Finally, in Part IV, I pose the question: What, then, will become of 
America’s post-Brown narrative?  I tie the two recent U.S. Supreme 
Court rulings and my life story to my clinical development of an 
alternative construction of affirmative action.  I show that America’s 
major legal, political, and social objections to affirmative action are 
twofold.  First, affirmative action has come to mean a search for 
cultural diversity that is perceived as un-American: discriminatory, 
restrictive, and exclusive.  Only a small number of people with the 
right skin pigmentation qualify for the extraordinary benefit of 
preferred treatment in admissions.  Second, the goal of cultural 
diversity has been reduced to body counts and numerical targets, 
regardless of whether relationships improve among all racial groups.  
America is not satisfied with the minimalist goal of legal 
desegregation; America seeks cultural integration. 
But then I show how these two objections can be overcome.  I 
argue that cultural diversity must be understood as too limited a goal.  
Cultural diversity benefits target racial classifications and, thus, 
represent a crude substantive agenda for increasing the number of 
individual success stories of people of color.  In practice, it restricts 
affirmative action to race per se, a list of mutually exclusive boxes to 
be checked.  Then I describe how the substantive agenda of 
affirmative action can and must expand its mission to cultural justice 
for all.  The ecology of cultural justice widens the focus from race per 
se to race relations—i.e., everyone’s opportunity and responsibility to 
build a new community of racial integration among all Americans.  
Cultural justice shifts the emphasis from the static assembly of a 
desired number of representatives of various racial groups (cultural 
diversity) to a dynamic interchange of group accountability and group 
recognition among all participants—i.e., mutually beneficial 
collaboration and optimal relational processes across racial and 
gender lines (the ecology of cultural justice).25 
 
25 In the words of the Grutter opinion, “the Law School’s admissions policy promotes 
cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables students to 
better understand persons of different races.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 
(2003) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Jerome McCristal Culp, 
Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal 
Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991). 
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Rather than develop my arguments in the abstract for moving 
beyond substance-driven goals to process-driven affirmative action, I 
report below on a clinical law school case study on the ecology of 
cultural justice.  This example, which examines the connection 
between K-12 education and the juvenile justice system, illuminates 
stages and principles of integrationist studies and practice that inform 
and guide the ecology of cultural justice.26  I also sketch and explain 
how well-designed clinical efforts in integration studies and practice 
follow a public policy negotiation strategy of integrative bargaining.  
This approach to affirmative action is comprised of three stages of 
community problem solving, the last of which completes the cycle 
and loops back to the first stage. 
I 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE QUEST FOR INTEGRATIVE 
BARGAINING 
I have been a legal educator for twenty years.  One key focus of my 
pedagogy is to call upon law students to use their education to 
promote civic inclusion, to increase the opportunity for all Americans, 
and to participate meaningfully in the building of our nation.  To this 
end, I challenge the whole class throughout the semester, through 
academic exercises and field work, to turn affirmative action into the 
ambitious quest of integrative bargaining.  This quest, I explain, takes 
shape through three steps: (1) integrate the voices, (2) integrate the 
issues, and, finally, (3) integrate the community. 
A.  Integrate the Voices: Who Else Is at Risk? 
The first stage of integrative bargaining brings together diverse 
voices, even oppositional viewpoints, to exchange strategies on the 
best way to define the presented issue in its widest context, as part of 
a cluster of related concerns affecting the community at large.27  
There will never be enough legal talent to teach society how to 
 
26 By no means am I suggesting that my clinical approach to integrationist studies and 
practices is the only, or best, method to either achieve racial integration or make 
affirmative action legally and politically acceptable.  But I have found time and again that 
this method is very effective and reflects experimentation with clinical instruction in the 
law school classroom for the past twenty years and both public policy negotiation and 
community problem solving over the last thirty years. 
27 See William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for 
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 472–74, 476–77 
(1994). 
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integrate voices or build a healthy community, but there will always 
be enough ordinary folk, especially poor people, to help each other 
better understand their web of life.  Many of these unassuming, 
everyday neighbors have tremendous problem-solving skill that is 
going untapped.28 
With this thought in mind, my law students and I embark on 
integrative bargaining by posing a foundational question among 
ourselves and community members: “Beyond those who obviously 
have a stake in how the dispute is currently sized up, who else needs 
to be at the negotiation table to enlarge the ‘pie’ and to optimize the 
division of the ‘slices’—i.e., who else can help us redefine the 
problem so that we achieve more gains both in relational process and 
substantive result?  Who else can help us situate the racial dispute in 
its broadest community context, generating excellent dialogue from a 
spectrum of views?” 
The “who else” question provides a template because it sheds light 
on a deeply entrenched structural problem underlying racial conflicts.  
Poor people in general and ethnic minorities in particular are largely 
relegated to pernicious labels and then dismissed and silenced by 
institutional decision making.  The “who else” query also keeps us 
mindful that settlement of racial disputes will be nothing more than 
stopgap measures, mere Band-Aids, unless we intentionally forge 
deeper connections, improve working relationships among insiders 
and outsiders to institutional decision making, and eradicate 
prejudicial stereotypes.  As applied below to disciplinary policies in 
K-12 public education and the incarceration of juveniles, disparaging 
and racist labels applied by the community to Latino youth—
“truants,” “drop-outs,” and “gang bangers”—are proven false as these 
youngsters learn to speak out as advocates for their actual roles in the 
community: peer teachers, peer court judges, and peer leaders. 
B.  Integrate the Issues: What More Is at Stake? 
The second stage of integrative bargaining strengthens the template 
by raising a different question: “What more is at stake as we place the 
present issue in the three timeframes of immediate results, short-term 
 
28 Gerald P. López, The Work We Know So Little About, reprinted in THE LATINO/A 
CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER 339, 345 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) 
(“[Low-income women of color] simply find themselves drawn to those informal 
strategies more within their control and less threatening than subjecting the little they have 
to the invasive experience and uncertain outcomes of the legal culture.”). 
 166 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 157 
gain, and long-range direction?”29  When proceeding in this way, 
efforts to resolve the immediate race conflict expand to a host of other 
short-term and long-range issues of importance for many more 
parties, including sustaining goodwill and contributing needed 
resources over the long haul.30  Best of all, my students and I have 
found that, when we press parties to engage in integrative bargaining 
over a longer timeline, the improvements in race relations benefit all 
people but result in a disproportionate positive difference for people 
of color.  For example, as discussed in Part IV below, our clinical 
intervention in school disciplinary policies and juvenile-detention 
practices was designed to help all affected children, but the lion’s 
share of the benefit has already been enjoyed by children of color and 
will inure even more to their benefit as their high school graduation 
rates increase in years to come—and juvenile delinquency rates 
decrease. 
C.  Integrate the Community: Where Do We Go Next to Extend the 
Ecology of Cultural Justice? 
The third question of integrative bargaining both completes and 
renews the template of affirmative action as a method of public policy 
negotiation by asking: “Where do we go next to extend the ecology of 
cultural justice?”  By remaining mindful of the “where next” 
question, my students and I take greater advantage of our bold 
experiment in community problem solving.  We keep an eye on the 
next application of our work: Where should we spread the news and 
broadcast the findings?  Who needs to hear our progress report?  We 
return to our original question with renewed conviction: “Who else is 
at risk?”  And our answer is that neighborhood groups, sports leagues, 
professional associations, city councils, school districts, legislatures, 
and other public entities are looking for better approaches to chronic 
and simmering racial inequities. 
When my students and I distill our local voices into a colorful story 
and offer our account as a template of community problem solving for 
others to consider, we engage in a form of activist mediation that I 
call public interest mediation.  Knowing how important it is to pass 
along a tale of progress, we take seriously our responsibility to 
 
29 See David Dominguez, Getting Beyond Yes to Collaborative Justice: The Role of 
Negotiation in Community Lawyering, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 55, 58 (2005). 
30 See generally, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING 
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
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publicize our story at public meetings, calling for new audiences to 
begin their own wider inquiry into racial conflict.  This results in 
bringing the effort full circle and inviting a greater cross-section to 
ask their own question: “Who else is at risk?”  As applied below to 
school discipline and juvenile detention, integrative bargaining 
prompted my students and me to tell our story to a countywide 
resolution board.  This board, representing a full cross-section of 
community and county leaders, in turn enlisted the help of a public 
regional university, Utah Valley University, to sponsor Challenge 
Day, a national program that empowers school children to build an 
integrated student body among themselves.31  Challenge Day turned 
into Challenge Days, three days of intense training in integration 
studies and practice.  Combining large group presentations with small 
group activity and other forms of intervention, Challenge Days took 
an alternative high school with three-hundred at-risk students on the 
journey to the new American community.  This, in turn, inspired my 
law school students to fashion large group presentations and small 
group discussions for at-risk children incarcerated at the local juvenile 
detention center.  My students and I have been teaching these children 
both how best to prepare for impending hearings as well as how to 
restore relationships in the home and at school.  Finally, after three 
years of working inside the detention center, we have joined forces 
with community leaders to make the public aware of how the juvenile 
justice system is sweeping up too many children, especially children 
of color, and increasingly becoming a carbon copy of the adult 
criminal justice system. 
II 
MY LIFE IN SEARCH OF A POST-BROWN NARRATIVE 
A.  Los Angeles, Yale, UC Berkeley, and BYU 
I was raised in, at the time, one of the toughest sections of Los 
Angeles in the vicinity of the University of Southern California 
campus.  There was no way I was supposed to reach my eighteenth 
year, let alone attend Yale University, receive legal training at the 
University of California, Berkeley, then move to Utah to join the law 
faculty at Brigham Young University, where I have been teaching for 
twenty years. 
 
31 See generally Challenge Day, How it Works, http://www.challengeday.org/law-
program/how-it-works.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
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In 1978, I marched in the streets of San Francisco alongside radical 
student groups to protest the threat of the Bakke32 decision ending 
affirmative action in higher education.  More recently, in 2004, I 
marched in Washington, D.C., with fellow SALT33 law professors to 
engage in a similar protest against the Grutter decision.  I relish 
progressive, community legal work in the reddest of red counties, 
Utah County,34 in the reddest of red states, Utah.35  But I am getting 
ahead of my story. 
B.  1954 
In 1954, all nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court spoke with 
one voice in Brown v. Board of Education.36  Henceforth, America 
would be a land where all children would get equal opportunity to 
excel academically.  No longer would children be robbed of their 
educational promise on account of skin color.  A new nation was truly 
born in 1954, and the unanimity among nine quite diverse Supreme 
Court Justices was striking.  Of one accord, they issued a challenge to 
all Americans to do whatever was necessary, as quickly as necessary, 
to take the printed words of a legal opinion and turn them into a full-
fledged reality of educational equity and racial harmony. 
In 1954, my story began as well.  I, the newest member of the 
Dominguez family, was the fourth child, the oldest being five years of 
age at the time.  Even though this would mean six people scratching 
out a living in a tiny ramshackle “cottage” in one of the scariest 
sections of inner-city Los Angeles, there was unanimity of joy and 
celebration in the household.  Let the new story begin! 
 
32 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
33 See Society of American Law Teachers, Background Information For the Media, 
Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.saltlaw.org/userfiles/file/SALT PDF Documents /8-18-
09Background Information For the Media.pdf (“In 2003, SALT was active in organizing 
and participating in a march in Washington in support of affirmative action.”). 
34 Funny how, while incubating the ecology of cultural justice in Provo, Utah, the lyrics 
of “New York, New York” often come to mind: “If I can make it there, I’ll make it 
anywhere.  It’s up to you.” FRANK SINATRA, New York, New York, on TRILOGY: PAST 
PRESENT FUTURE (Reprise Records 1980). 
35 The Princeton Review of Colleges and Universities has ranked Brigham Young 
University as the top school in the category “Stone-Cold Sober” for 12 years in a row.  See 
Marc Haddock, BYU is Soberest in Nation—Again, DESERET NEWS (Utah), July 27, 2009, 
at B01, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705319503/BYU-is-soberest-in-
nation-2-again.html. 
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Both for Brown and for the new brown child, the legal and social 
reality of racial discrimination in 1954 America meant lean times lay 
ahead.  No matter how happy my father was at my birth, it did not 
increase employment opportunities or the size of the paycheck for a 
naturalized Mexican who immigrated with hopes of achieving the 
American dream.  He worked very hard but wound up with very little 
except bitter experiences of being told, “No Mexicans need apply,” or 
the ubiquitous sign, “No dogs or Mexicans allowed.” 
In 1962, when President Kennedy was forced to send federal 
marshals to assist in the enforcement of Brown, I did not know, as a 
boy of eight, that there was anything odd or amiss with the ethnic 
makeup of my predominately Black and Latino neighborhood that 
included a smattering of virtually all other ethnic minorities.  It did 
not faze me that the student population of my school included very 
few whites. 
As every kid could testify growing up during my years in the 
killing fields of downtown and South Central Los Angeles, the 
chances of surviving childhood in one piece were not good.  If gangs, 
drugs, and gunfire did not claim us, sexually-transmitted diseases 
would.  If somehow I made it to my eighteenth birthday, Vietnam was 
waiting to send me to a new killing field far, far away—most likely to 
come back home in a pine box.37  Prospects were dim, to say the 
least, that Brown would ever mean anything to brown and black 
children. 
C.  Jail 
When I was ten or eleven, a bunch of children, including me, 
gathered on the playground.  Since it was a Sunday, the playground 
was closed, and there was nothing to do.  Bored and restless, someone 
suggested we break into the equipment room of the school and 
“liberate” the sports gear.  Before the suggestion was complete, we 
were jimmying the lock into the facility.  Once inside, we 
remembered that the best stuff was secured in a second-story closet.  
We climbed the steel ladder that led up to the closet and broke the 
lock.  All inside, we marveled at the gloves, helmets, and baseball 
 
37 See LEA YBARRA, VIETNAM VETERANOS: CHICANOS RECALL THE WAR 5 (2004)  
(“Mexican Americans accounted for approximately 20 percent of U.S. casualties in 
Vietnam, although they made up only 10 percent of this country’s population at the 
time.”). 
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bats.  One of the older guys blurted out, “Hey, we can fetch good coin 
for these items.  I know where we can pawn this stuff.” 
I was horrified.  Breaking and entering to use the equipment struck 
me as worthwhile, even resourceful, but I had no desire to steal.  I 
liked the playground director and could not bear the thought of him 
seeing me as a thief.  So I started to back out of the room, saying to 
the others that I wanted no part of their plan.  As my feet reached the 
threshold of the door, however, my heel caught on the lip of the 
threshold, and I started to fall straight back through the door.  My 
knees buckled, and I fell headfirst from the second-story closet onto 
solid concrete.  My body twitched uncontrollably, and then I froze. 
I later learned from the other guys that they figured I had killed 
myself and that they would be blamed for causing the death.  They 
immediately replaced all the sports equipment, ran away from the 
playground, and left me there sprawled out on the concrete, bleeding 
from my head. 
We were all on our way to the jail at the juvenile detention center 
when the playground director, piecing together the story of how we 
almost stole the baseball gear, intervened.  You might say he went to 
bat for me, and I was removed from the group headed for lockup.  
Apparently, it was decided that the night spent at the county psych 
ward and the baseball-size lump on the side of my head was 
punishment enough. 
D.  Yale 
Then 1972 happened.  I was seventeen and looking to graduate 
from high school that year.  I had enjoyed the party life of high school 
and was prepared to join the workforce.  I had no thought of going to 
college the day I was summoned to meet with the high school 
counselor.  Mrs. MacKenzie, the lead counselor, wasted no time: 
“Have you heard of Yale?”38  “No,” I replied.  “Do you know where 
New Haven, Connecticut is?”  Again I replied that I had no idea of 
what she was talking about.  She reached back to a large rolled-up 
map of the United States, placed it on her desk, unrolled it, and asked: 
“Do you know where Los Angeles is on the map?”  I placed my 
finger on the large dot signifying the City of Angels, and Mrs. 
MacKenzie then lifted my finger and placed it back down on the 
extreme other side of the map: “Here is New Haven.”  She carefully 
 
38 For a second, I thought she pronounced the name as “jail,” producing flashbacks and 
freaking me out. 
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explained that there was a group of illustrious universities on the East 
Coast known as the “Ivy League,” and Yale, in particular, was 
aggressively pursuing a radical social and educational experiment 
called “affirmative action.”  Yale was asking Mrs. MacKenzie to 
identify one graduating senior who possessed the raw academic talent 
and boundless temerity to take his place in the 1972 entering class.  “I 
immediately thought of you, David.” 
So the Brown decision, helped mightily by explosive riots in major 
cities, as well as ongoing street protests and public demonstrations 
around the country, found a way to deliver on its promise to me in 
1972.  “But why was I picked?” I wondered.  I had done nothing to 
deserve the radical new trajectory of my life story. 
It was soon painfully obvious to everyone that I did not merit an 
admissions spot in the Yale freshman class.  I had no credentials to 
stack up against the academic prowess, amazing accomplishments, 
and cultural sophistication of my fellow “Elis.”  And this fact became 
abundantly clear when the first essay I wrote in English was returned 
to me covered in red ink with a note appended to the grade of “0.”  
The professor wrote: “I would have given this paper an F, but that 
would be giving it too much credit.” 
Things went from bad to worse that first semester of freshman 
year.  Consequently, I decided that I would bide my time until the 
Christmas break rolled around, fly home, and never return.  While 
pondering this plan over lunch one day in late November, a very 
pretty coed, Catie Stevens, asked what I was planning to do during the 
upcoming Thanksgiving weekend.  When I said I’d be hanging 
around campus, she invited me to spend the weekend at her family 
estate in Wallingford.  Mind you, the Stevens family, led by the 
father, John B. Stevens (J.B.), was truly the upper-crust of East Coast 
society, and here I was, a low-class thug for all intents and purposes, 
being asked to join in their traditional, family Thanksgiving dinner.  I 
leapt at the chance! 
That Thanksgiving the whole Stevens family made me feel 
completely at home despite the extreme cultural chasm between us.  
Catie’s act at the dining hall of going well out of her way to show 
kindness was, I soon learned, a common trait of the Stevens family.  
Early the next morning, J.B. asked me to join him along a favorite 
footpath.  As we walked along the snowy fields of the Stevens estate, 
J.B. inquired about my experience so far at Yale.  I was so grateful for 
his love and comfort—and already impressed that Yale meant so 
much to his family with many generations of “Old Blues”—that I 
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could not bring myself to answer his question honestly.  I still felt the 
acute sting of that “0” on my first English essay. 
J.B. could see disconsolation written all over me.  After I mumbled 
something similar to “Yale is a great place, but, maybe, I am just too 
far behind academically to ever catch up,” he looked straight at me 
and asked if I was leaving something out, namely what I offered to 
the education of my Yale classmates.  “Me?” I answered, incredulous 
at his suggestion.  I thought to myself, the biggest “major” at my 
downtown Los Angeles high school was English as a second 
language!  There is nothing I bring to the table at Yale except glaring, 
woeful deficiencies.  I am totally out of my element, and there is no 
way I’ll ever fit in.  Yep, I am going to quit.  Despite the hopes of 
Brown, the “affirmative action” experiment failed. 
J.B. could see the wheels spinning in my mind and took it upon 
himself to forever change my life with his challenge.  He said: 
Let’s assume that it will take you working as hard as you ever have, 
day and night, for you to catch up to your classmates.  Yes, it will 
be difficult, maybe even painful at times.  But it can be done, and 
you can do it or else Yale would not have asked you to join the 
freshman class.  Now let’s consider this from the other side of the 
fence.  What would it take for them to catch up to lessons you have 
learned growing up the way you did?  How long do you think your 
classmates would last if they were dropped suddenly into your 
neighborhood? 
I remember smiling broadly inside, perhaps laughing out loud, at 
the thought of my preppy classmates trying to make it alive through 
even one day in the ‘hood.  J.B. said: 
You see, you can catch up with their book learning.  But can they 
catch up to your street smarts?  How?  They will not grasp what life 
is like for poor people in the inner city unless someone like you 
teaches them the lessons you learned the hard way.  So go back and 
teach them.  What you offer Yale is as important as what Yale 
offers you. 
That morning walk and conversation with J.B. turned my life 
around.  It was so wholly improbable that a top executive of a major 
international company would take a long walk with me.  Why did 
Catie, then her dad and the rest of her family, go out of their way to 
help me? 
I returned to Yale after Thanksgiving determined to make my voice 
speak for my family and the people of my background.  It hit me full 
force that I needed to stick up for the guardian angels of my 
boyhood—devoted parents, teachers, playground leaders, and church 
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folk—who did what they could to give me a second chance.  To make 
a long story short, I brought my grades to respectable marks during 
my freshman year and, then, proceeded to excel for my remaining 
years. 
But more to the point, I took the lesson of that Stevens Family 
Thanksgiving to another level.  I realized how few inner-city kids 
would ever learn the lesson J.B. taught me: what we have to teach the 
powerful is as important as anything they have to teach us.39 
III 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR A POST-BROWN NARRATIVE: GRUTTER OR 
PARENTS INVOLVED? 
In this section, I explain how Grutter and Parents Involved 
compete to provide America with its post-Brown narrative for the 
twenty-first century.  Each opinion retells the story of affirmative 
action to serve its own ends and paints a distinctly different picture of 
the multicultural American people that the Court would like us to 
become.  Below, I show how each opinion accentuates one of two key 
aspects of the narrative, either race as a fixed and static label that is 
mutually exclusive (race per se) or race as a catalytic opportunity for 
flexible, adaptive, and civic inclusion (race relations).  The Court in 
Parents Involved favored the former interpretation and, thus, turned 
the narrative into a eulogy.  It tried its best to preside over the burial 
of affirmative action as a pernicious tale of skin pigmentation being 
the basis of racial discrimination and preferential treatment.  
Conversely, in Grutter, the Supreme Court used terms such as 
“diversity factors besides race,”40 “critical mass,”41 and even 
proposed a deadline of 2028 to shift the emphasis of affirmative 
action away from hostile, zero-sum constructions and toward 
advantages for all Americans.42 
 
39 I have taken J.B.’s wisdom to heart ever since.  At Yale, I started a service 
organization that called upon fellow Yalies to hang around poor Puerto Rican children 
living in New Haven so each side could communicate in new ways with the other.  During 
law school at UC Berkeley, I co-founded the Minority Pre-Law Coalition on the 
undergraduate campus, which highlighted the exceptional leadership and scholastic 
abilities of students of color and grew to three-hundred college students, mostly of color, 
but including college classmates from all backgrounds.  During my years as a law 
professor, I have applied J.B.’s teaching to many community struggles for freedom and 
justice. 
40 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003). 
41 Id. at 333. 
42 See id. at 343. 
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The Grutter opinion offers the better view because its reasoning 
turns on the distinction between race per se and race relations.  This 
differentiation is founded on a well-established distinction in 
integrative bargaining, namely the difference between substantive 
outcome (race per se) and process gains (race relations).  Although 
Grutter does not go far enough to make the case for moving beyond 
race per se to race relations, it opens the door to a progressive and 
inclusive version of affirmative action that extends its benefits to 
everyone. 
Before proceeding, the stage must be set by explaining the crucial 
distinction between substantive outcome and relational process and 
how differing emphases in Grutter and Parents Involved led to rival 
post-Brown accounts of affirmative action. 
A.  Substantive Outcome, Relational Process, and Legal Problem 
Solving 
Legal education demands attention to after-the-fact analysis of 
legal disputes and the importance of securing a satisfactory 
substantive outcome in settlement of a legal claim.  A lawyer is 
trained to deliver a remedial result that brings acceptable closure and 
finality to the case at hand.  I agree that lawyers are duty-bound to 
obtain the very best substantive outcome for their clients.  But legal 
problem solving cannot achieve optimal substantive results without 
the precondition of far-reaching process gains and relational 
enrichment.43 
By relational process, I refer to the professional skill set that elicits 
the best input and proposals from interested parties not only on 
current disputes but also in anticipation of recurring problems.44  
Relational process creates new value from a variety of perspectives 
and agendas, distributes the value fairly to settle the matter at hand, 
 
43 For more information, see books published by the Harvard Negotiation Project, 
including: ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter GETTING TO YES]; DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. 
SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986); and MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 30.  
These texts are foundational to the field of negotiation theory and practice. 
44 See Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 965 (2001) (“Transformative 
politics requires looking beyond winning or losing the particular legal dispute or political 
battle and asking how one’s actions serve to reinforce people’s awareness of our 
interdependence and mutual responsibility as members of the human family.”). 
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and then requests ongoing relationships among individuals and 
agencies to better anticipate and prevent inchoate legal claims.45 
Let us take a closer look at this distinction between substantive 
outcome and relational process by applying it to the example of 
school desegregation in Brown.  The law was changed to declare that 
“separate but equal” was unconstitutional.46  The U.S. Supreme Court 
banned segregation in public schools.47  No one questions that 
denouncing segregation in public education as illegal was a major 
substantive gain.  But the law and lawyers cannot deliver the ultimate 
relational process gain of integration—the interpersonal commitment 
needed to form a unified American community.48  Integration 
requires legal problem solvers to teach themselves and requires other 
community leaders to be vigilant, to speak out against vestiges and 
remnants of racism and cultural insensitivity, and to pursue goodwill 
and mutual trust as much as they pursue outward structural 
improvement.  Desired substantive legal reform (e.g., desegregation) 
is an excellent start, but such reform must be sustained by relational 
process among people who strive for dynamic infusion of diverse 
ideals and pluralistic ambitions (e.g., integration).  Absent attention to 
continuous process gains and social harmony, we risk that the 
substantive outcome will, at best, produce a hollow and illusory 
victory and, at worst, provide the “cure” that kills the patient—i.e., 
white flight and resegregation. 
B.  Applying the Substance/Process Distinction to Grutter and Parents 
Involved 
In 2003, a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court held in Grutter v. 
Bollinger that the University of Michigan Law School could lawfully 
consider the racial classification of an applicant so long as it did so as 
part of an individualized, holistic review process applied equally to all 
 
45 I teach my students that there can be no breakthrough on cultural justice unless the 
ongoing community relationships among the privileged and disadvantaged are turned 
upside down and the wealthy learn to say to the poor: “We need you.” 
46 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
47 Id. 
48 Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1–2 
(1996) (“[W]hat seems remarkable is not how much litigation there is, but how little.  For 
example, most members of society suffer harms, inconveniences, and injustices that 
infringe on their legal rights and could be, if they chose, grounds for legal action.” 
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
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applicants.49  Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, agreed that 
the goal of cultural diversity in the law school student body justified 
the program under the law,50 but the plurality was plainly troubled by 
what it faced.  The plurality opinion in Grutter and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Grutter’s companion case, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, made clear that she opposed affirmative action as a zero-
sum concept, created by giving an admissions slot to one applicant of 
color at the expense of a white applicant solely on the basis of skin 
color.51  Justice O’Connor further argued that, consistent with Bakke, 
race as a component of affirmative action admissions can be, in some 
circumstances, a legally justifiable consideration when it serves to 
remedy provable acts of illegal racial discrimination committed by the 
educational institution in question.52  The use of race as a component 
of admissions cannot be justified as a social engineering tool used by 
higher education in an effort to reverse or repair America’s history of 
racial inequality. 
C.  “Cultural Diversity”: Integrate the Voices 
Interestingly, the Grutter plurality did not take issue with the 
dissenters’ point that it is artificial, if not disingenuous, to assemble a 
certain number of people representing different ethnic backgrounds 
and call that assembly “cultural diversity.”53  Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion parted ways with the dissent, however, in the 
understanding that cultural diversity is not a dead-end calculation that 
 
49 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336–39 (2003). 
50 Id. at 337–38. 
51 Id. at 336–39; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276–77 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  In Gratz, the Court ruled that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
admissions process was unconstitutional because it considered race as a factor but did so 
as part of a system that reserved a certain amount of points for only those from certain 
racial backgrounds.  Id. at 270 (finding the University’s policy not narrowly-tailored).  The 
Court held the undergraduate system unlawful because it did not permit all applicants to 
compete equally for all available seats.  Id. at 270–71. 
52 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
53 Justice Thomas points out in his opinion, dissenting in part: 
“[D]iversity,” for all its devotees, is more a fashionable catchphrase than it is a 
useful term, especially when something as serious as racial discrimination is at 
issue.  Because the Equal Protection Clause renders the color of one’s skin 
constitutionally irrelevant to the Law School’s mission, I refer to the Law 
School’s interest as an “aesthetic.”  That is, the Law School wants to have a 
certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the 
color of the students sitting at them. 
Id. at 354–55 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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remains fixed once admissions decisions are made and the entering 
class is seated.54  Cultural diversity does not consist of flat and static 
numbers, e.g., having twenty-five Latinos in the entering class; it only 
starts to take shape at that point.  Cultural diversity is supposed to 
change over time depending on the quality of interaction among law 
students and faculty.  Grutter thus opens up a new dialogue on 
affirmative action as an expression of integrative bargaining, 
emphasizing that cultural diversity is not a function of race per se but 
of race relations that are by nature inchoate and emergent.  Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion expects higher education to understand that 
affirmative action is no longer to be viewed as a one-time snapshot 
factor during the initial stage of admissions decisions, but rather as an 
ongoing, educational resource among law students, lawyers, and the 
larger American community. 
Although the Grutter opinion never explicitly refers to negotiation 
theory and practice, Justice O’Connor’s use of cultural diversity is 
consistent with the teachings of integrative bargaining.  She calls the 
nation to move beyond race per se to race relations, to turn 
affirmative action in higher education into a flexible, adaptive, 
mutually beneficial opportunity for all Americans: “Access to legal 
education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all 
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the 
educational institutions that provide the training and education 
necessary to succeed in America.”55 
D.  “Critical Mass”: Integrate the Issues 
The use of “critical mass” in Grutter challenged law schools to not 
only address one substantive issue—increasing the representation of 
minorities in legal education—but to aim for a higher goal.  Why not 
use this effort in affirmative action as a template to fix legal education 
as a whole?  Indeed, “critical mass” signifies a student body that 
exceeds a token, nonthreatening window dressing, or a negligible 
smattering of color, and gathers enough outspoken, multicultural 
Americans precisely to make a real critical difference in law school 
pedagogy and law practice.  “Critical mass” calls for learning 
conditions that allow all students to engage in bold experimentation, 
through clinical exercises, in public policy negotiation to offer a 
 
54 See id. at 308–09 (plurality opinion). 
55 Id. at 332–33. 
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startling, critical perspective on what must be changed in America to 
provide equal opportunities.56  Thus, we will reach a critical mass 
when there is ongoing effort by the law school administration, faculty, 
and student body to abandon conventional “talking head” instruction 
and solitary learning in favor of collaboration on a new priority in 
legal education: clinical curriculum that equips the affirmative action 
admits and interested classmates to master integrationist studies and 
practice.57  These new courses, and the reworking of current 
offerings, must provide ample practice in building an emergent 
community among diverse, mutually respected classmates.58  Why do 
this?  Because it is critical to the future of legal education, law 
practice, and America’s standing in the world that affirmative action 
be understood as a template for public policy negotiation.59  In the 
words of Justice O’Connor, critical mass is the precondition that 
“better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society, and better prepares them as professionals.”60  “[T]he skills 
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be 
 
56 In praising the benefits of cultural diversity in the classroom, the Grutter plurality 
stated: “[C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening 
and interesting when the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”  Id. 
at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But this begs the question: if it is not acceptable 
to look backward at past societal discrimination as justification for race-preferential 
admissions policies, why is it acceptable to look backward at conventional pedagogy 
dominated by white males?  Why is there no insistence that a corresponding duty of the 
law school is to look forward with its instructional methods and prove that it is 
experimenting with clinical courses in integrationist studies and practice? 
57 Justice Scalia, writing in dissent in Grutter, scolds the law school for putting so much 
effort into cosmetic, political expediency rather than pursuing the much harder work of 
improving pedagogy for the betterment of a diverse American society.  Id. at 347–48 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He argues that the plurality opinion 
will spawn more lawsuits precisely to “challenge the bona fides of the institution’s 
expressed commitment to the educational benefits of diversity . . . (Tempting targets, one 
would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of multiculturalism . . . but walk 
the walk of tribalism and racial segregation . . . .).”  Id. at 349. 
58 “[D]iminishing the force of such [racial] stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law 
School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority 
students.”  Id. at 333 (plurality opinion). 
59 Wendell Berry, in his powerful essay Solving for Pattern, argues that unless we solve 
particular gardening and agricultural problems with an understanding of the larger 
ecosystem surrounding those problems, we are bound to make matters worse in the long 
run, even if we “end” the immediate problem for the time being.  WENDELL BERRY, 
Solving For Pattern, THE NEW FARM, reprinted in THE GIFT OF GOOD LAND: FURTHER 
ESSAYS CULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL 134 (1981).  Berry extrapolates powerful 
teachings from his work as a farmer and his love of the land.  Those lessons apply 
forcefully to legal education when understood as an ecology of justice.  See id. at 134–45. 
60 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, 
and viewpoints.”61 
E.  2028: Integrate the Community 
Finally, the Court’s imposition of a deadline of 2028 must be 
considered through the lens of the substance/process distinction.  The 
Court found in Grutter that the law school’s race-sensitive admission 
decisions met constitutional muster in those particular circumstances 
but, then, went on to impose a deadline on how much longer such 
affirmative action practices would be deemed lawful, namely until 
2028.  “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”62 
Hence, the Court’s approval of race consideration in Grutter was 
intended as an intermediate provision, a “holding pattern” as it were, 
giving higher education an opportunity to design and implement 
admission policies making racial background irrelevant.  To insure 
that interested parties pursued a post-Grutter world with urgency, the 
Court granted affirmative action a stay of execution for only twenty-
five years, for one more generation of college students and graduate 
students. 
The Court’s use of a deadline accomplished two objectives.  First, 
in the short term, the deadline impressed a blunt message upon all 
Americans concerned with race relations: “Don’t waste time!  
Communicate now on various interests, exploring and testing 
alternatives to the polarizing, divisive policy of affirmative action!  
Redouble the effort to shift the emphasis in affirmative action away 
from race as fixed substance to fluid, process-driven experiments in 
building inclusive communities.”  Grutter’s long-term goal of 
declaring a final year for affirmative action, however, was far more 
ambitious.  The Court suggested that the more serious Americans are 
about relational process and the more we understand how 
improvement of race relations is the primary function, if not essential 
purpose, of affirmative action, the more advantage we will take of 
race relations as a template to prepare us for even greater national and 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 343. 
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worldwide struggles, thus incubating the ecology of cultural justice 
for future generations.63 
F.  Parents Involved: Squandering Grutter’s Promising Approach to 
Affirmative Action 
In its 2007 decision in Parents Involved, the U.S. Supreme Court 
published the latest chapter on the law governing the use of race as a 
factor in deciding which school children could be placed in various 
schools.64  In Parents Involved, which dealt with the use of race in 
admission to high school and K-12 public education, the Court 
deemed unconstitutional the use of race in specific placement 
programs employed by both the Seattle and the Louisville school 
districts.65 
The plurality opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, looked back to the Court’s watershed decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education and reasoned that America’s post-Brown 
narrative had no place for racially discriminatory systems in these 
contexts, even if motivated by benign purposes.66  The opinion 
argued that both placement programs were, in effect, substance-
driven, zero-sum games that focused on race as a fixed reality.67  By 
merely checking a box indicating membership in one of the favored 
racial groups, a student jumped to the head of the line over those not 
belonging to those groups. 
 
63 See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search 
for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 81 (2002) (“The empowerment 
element of transformative mediation does not encourage individuals to obtain power to 
pursue selfish ends.  Rather, it encourages them to take control over their lives, shed 
dependency and self-absorption, and exercise responsibility over their decisions and 
actions.”). 
64 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Parents Involved, wrote: “However 
closely related race-based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself 
cannot be the goal, whether labeled ‘racial diversity’ or anything else.”  Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 753 (2007) (plurality opinion).  
Further, he wrote, “Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve racial 
balance would be ‘patently unconstitutional.’”  Id. at 740 (citation omitted).  Justice 
Breyer wrote in dissent that “[b]oth [school] districts sought greater racial integration for 
educational and democratic, as well as for remedial, reasons.”  Id. at 820 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
65 Id. at 747–48 (plurality opinion). 
66 Id. at 746–48.  In a line that will surely become famous or infamous, depending on 
the reader’s viewpoint, Chief Justice Roberts stated, “The way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”  Id. at 748. 
67 Id. at 734–35. 
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Justice Breyer wrote in his dissent that America’s post-Brown 
narrative can tolerate further judicial promotion of racial targets such 
as those advanced by the schools’ placement policies because the goal 
of those programs is so important.68  Justice Breyer argued that 
Brown still stands for the proposition that American justice will never 
wipe away permanent stains of racism, no matter how hard it scrubs, 
unless and until people of color are represented in colleges and 
professions in numbers reflecting their numbers in the general 
population.69 
The Court did not use this occasion to disturb or otherwise 
explicitly question its holding or rationale in Grutter.  Indeed, one 
way to look at the Parents Involved decision is to say that it does not 
do anything to expand or limit the Grutter opinion.  Another way to 
look at Parents Involved, however, is that both the plurality and the 
dissent failed miserably to build on Grutter’s effort to de-emphasize 
race as an unchangeable substance in favor of dynamic race relations.  
These eight Justices returned to an old question that Grutter ruled is 
no longer applicable: When is it permissible to both size up fellow 
Americans based on obvious, outward racial indicators and use those 
measurements to grant or deny educational benefits? 
Justice Kennedy wrote separately in Parents Involved and 
developed a post-Brown narrative that avoids the trap of construing 
and weighing race crudely—as mere substance.70  Kennedy’s opinion 
instead calls upon the educational community to pursue creative 
efforts toward building an integrated community,71 which is to say 
that his rationale and decision followed the teachings of Grutter.  On 
the one hand, Justice Kennedy joined the plurality of four Justices in 
deciding, five to four, that the placement systems before the Court 
were unconstitutional because they restricted public school benefits to 
favored racial groups lucky enough to have the right (“non-white”) 
skin color.72 
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy made it clear that he could not 
sign the plurality opinion because it tried to recast America’s post-
 
68 Id. at 838–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
69 See id. at 866–68. 
70 Id. at 792–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 787–89. 
72 Id. at 786 (“[The school district] has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a 
diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified as ‘white,’ it has 
employed the crude racial categories of ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ as the basis for its 
assignment decisions.”). 
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Brown narrative as a simplistic tale of rejecting racially exclusionary 
practices.73  Picking up where Grutter left off, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion honestly sought to account for race relations in 
America as an epic saga of twisted, tortured moves and 
countermoves.  While he agreed with the plurality that race programs 
were forbidden when based on nothing more than skin color, he 
concluded that affirmative action as a process-driven inclusion 
practice could be acceptable under the Constitution.74  In short, 
Justice Kennedy insisted that the story line remains true not only to 
the theme of rejecting exclusion but also furthering inclusion.75  
Hence, he wrote separately to insist that the ruling in Parents Involved 
not be taken as backtracking on the nation’s commitment to healing 
race divisions.76  Instead, Justice Kennedy argued that America was 
duty-bound to encourage experimentation and creative alternatives 
that would bring all races together.77  In keeping with the spirit of 
Grutter, he suggested practical strategies and initiatives for ending 
racial isolation and self-segregation in K-12 education.78 
IV 
A LAW SCHOOL CLINIC TURNING CULTURAL DIVERSITY INTO THE 
ECOLOGY OF CULTURAL JUSTICE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS 
INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING 
I have argued so far that there is a substance/process distinction 
embedded in Grutter’s plurality opinion that presents an opportunity 
to refashion the post-Brown narrative of affirmative action as a 
process-based alternative, one that emphasizes race relations among 
all students.  How far might Grutter take us in this direction?  Were 
 
73 Id. at 787–88.  Justice Kennedy contended: 
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has 
in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. . . . To the 
extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and 
local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it 
is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. 
Id. 
74 Id. at 786–91. 
75 Id. at 797 (“This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic 
commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its 
children.”). 
76 Id. at 797–98. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 788–90. 
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we to capture the full promise of Grutter by 2028, what would 
affirmative action look like reformatted as an expression of 
integrative bargaining?79 
In this section, I give the process-driven form of affirmative action 
a name: the ecology of cultural justice.  The quest is to move beyond 
cultural diversity as a strategy that focuses too narrowly on race per 
se.  Instead, the new mission is one of cultural justice, forging 
community bonds between and among both those who honor and 
respect historical race classifications and those who celebrate the 
emerging polyglot American resident as a world citizen.  Cultural 
justice looks to everyone to do their part for improving public health 
and safety for all Americans and holds everyone accountable through 
well-designed opportunities for collaboration and service. 
After the Grutter ruling in 2003, I designed a multi-year 
curriculum combining in-class academics with clinical application to 
put the full promise of Grutter to the test.  To what degree was 
Grutter prescient in foreseeing that affirmative action could become a 
process-driven quest to incubate the ecology of cultural justice by 
2028?80  The following case study presents my ongoing attempt since 
2004 to offer law school courses in integrationist studies and practice 
at Brigham Young University Law School.  Using this curriculum, I 
have taught students from their first through third year of law school 
to examine the connection between K-12 public education and the 
juvenile justice system from the perspective of law and social policy.  
Specifically, these students have been engaging in legal analysis of, 
and clinical intervention into, questions and practices such as these: 
When is a schoolhouse too much like a jailhouse, turning K-12 
education into a satellite system of juvenile justice without the 
requisite legal due process?81  At what point do schools pursue 
 
79 See generally Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning 
Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75 (2002) (describing the limitations that 
the traditional law school teaching style and learning environment imposes on students, in 
part, by diminishing student enthusiasm and empathy). 
80 These courses include a first-year course in Problem Solving for Equal Justice and a 
second- and third-year course in Community Lawyering. 
81 According to a recent study by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, the number of delinquency cases involving detention increased eleven percent 
between 1990 and 1999.  James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson & Ronald Weitzer, 
Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of Juvenile Offenders, JUV. JUST. 
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Programs, Wash., 
D.C.), Sept. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/ 208804.pdf.  
Another highly reputable nationwide study conducted by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
called the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), found that between 1985 and 
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correctional policies at the expense of their educational mission?  
When is it fair to recast truants and, later, school drop-outs, as school 
“push-outs” because of a school’s overly zealous enforcement of No 
Child Left Behind, zero-tolerance policies, and other pernicious 
public policies?82  Assuming schools refer push-outs to a juvenile 
detention facility, how will those youth, along with their families, 
learn of the federal right to public education and the statutory and 
constitutional protections that safeguard liberty interests and custodial 
rights of parents?83 
A.  The Ecology of Cultural Justice: Who Else Is at Risk? 
As one may realize from the foregoing description of my clinical 
intervention into K-12 public education and juvenile detention 
practices, there is no mention of correcting either overt or subtle 
discrimination against any racial groups in particular.  It is tempting 
to do so since youth of color make up a vastly disproportionate 
 
1995 the number of youth placed in secure confinement on an average day increased by 
seventy-four percent.  ROCHELLE STANFIELD, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE JDAI 
STORY: BUILDING A BETTER JUVENILE DETENTION SYSTEM 6 (1999), available at 
http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/jdai%20story.pdf.  The JDAI also found that 
less than one-third of juvenile offenders were detained for committing a violent crime.  Id. 
82 When I first learned of these cases regarding allegations of misdemeanors, stacked 
charges, and referral to detention, I could not understand why school-based discipline, 
such as suspension, was not an intermediate step until evidence could be gathered and 
weighed and the determination made whether any punishment was justified.  If the child 
presents no threat of physical harm or violence at school, why even resort to a short-term 
suspension, let alone impose the ultimate form of restraint, especially when we educate 
children that, under our system of justice, we are innocent until proven guilty?  Has the 
criminal law enforcement paradigm become so integrated in public schooling that it has 
corrupted the education paradigm?  See generally ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION 
ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK (2005); AUGUSTINA H. 
REYES, DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT, AND RACE: IS ZERO TOLERANCE THE ANSWER? 
(2006); Marilyn Elias, At Schools, Less Tolerance for ‘Zero Tolerance,’ USA TODAY, 
Aug. 10, 2006, at 6D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-08-09-
zero-tolerance_x.htm. 
83 For further discussion of the problem, see Bart Lubow, Senior Assoc., Annie E. 
Casey Found., Reducing Inappropriate Detention: A Focus on the Role of Defense 
Attorneys, Remarks at the 10th Annual Juvenile Law and Education Seminar (June 24, 
2005), in 11 JUV. JUST. UPDATE, Aug./Sept. 2005, at 1 (Civic Research Institute, New 
York, N.Y.).  Although juvenile delinquency hearings need not conform with all the 
requirements of a criminal trial, “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
“The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that 
bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of 
the administration of our criminal law.’”  Id. at 363. 
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percentage of truants, drop-outs, push-outs, and juvenile 
delinquents.84  Instead, our clinical focus is on protecting and 
improving the welfare of all youth.  My students and I get as many 
different parties to ask themselves to what degree they are impacted 
when educational or correctional polices deny any student a fair 
chance at a quality education, graduating from high school, perhaps 
pursuing college, and growing into a contributing member of society. 
The broad-based inquiry of “who else is at risk” elicits voices from 
all segments of the local population, particularly those who have been 
silent and ignored, and makes the most of their input and suggestions.  
Children and parents who have not otherwise been given a true 
opportunity to be heard are placed in the role of community teachers.  
For example, poorer families have made it known that they cannot 
afford to take their children to the doctor to get a formal medical note 
to excuse an absence as required by a school’s truancy policy.  
Encouraged by other parents who are similarly unable to satisfy the 
requirement of a doctor’s note, these families have pressed for a 
simple review process maintained by a group of parents to determine 
the legitimacy of the family’s petition for a medical excuse. 
By asking “who else,” one also enlists help from a full cross-
section of community members, including a wide variety of powerful 
“movers and shakers,” making more resources available to increase 
graduation rates and decrease truancy.  An illustration of this is 
internships and apprenticeships from employers willing to give career 
guidance to poor children.  In this way, affirmative action does not 
dwell on which race classifications ought to be given extra assistance, 
but rather becomes an exercise of community-based problem solving.  
The expansive focus on race relations is everyone’s concern and, thus, 
it promotes positive, sustainable relationships among diverse 
people—i.e., the ecology of cultural justice—and not just another 
 
84 See Juvenile Def. Network, Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC), 
http://www.youthadvocacyproject.org/JDN%20DMC.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (“In 
Massachusetts, children of color represent just 28 percent of the youth population. Yet 
minorities comprise 56 percent of those committed to [detention], 62 percent of those 
excluded from school, 73 percent of those charged as adults in juvenile court, and an 
alarming 77 percent of those confined to secure residential facilities.”); Juvenile Rehab. 
Admin., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement, http://www1.dshs.wa.gov/jra/facts/minority.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) 
(“[In the State of Washington,] youth of color account for approximately 45% of 
[detention] population [on any given day].  This is almost twice the proportion of youth of 
color in Washington State.”).  See generally Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, Disproportionate Minority Contact: About DMC, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/dmc/ 
about.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
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“coalition” to force outward substantive change.85  This newfound 
collaboration fulfills the true agenda of affirmative action: it redounds 
to the benefit of all youth but especially helps children who are 
immigrant, poor, and of color. 
It is worth noting that an aspect of this bargaining strategy, called 
interest convergence, has been questioned and, at times, excoriated by 
various commentators, including legal scholars of color that I highly 
esteem, notably Professors Derrick Bell86 and Richard Delgado.87  
They and others are skeptical about the benefits of this community-
negotiation principle, arguing that those in power can employ it as a 
manipulative, convenient tool, whether intentionally or not, to keep 
the “natives happy.”88  These scholars contend that the white power 
establishment exploits interest convergence to strike a public 
bargain—say, the rulings in Brown or Hernandez v. Texas89—that 
appears to improve the welfare of minority people when it actually 
does far more to reinforce their subjugation and prop up the reigning 
imbalance of power.90 
My view is that interest convergence has been given a “bad rap” by 
these scholars because they focus narrowly on when and how interest 
convergence is used.  Interest convergence is not an end in itself and 
certainly not the final stage of progressive public policy negotiation.  
It is merely the first step of integrative bargaining, an attempt to 
reveal and sort out diverse interests and competing post-Brown 
narratives.  Interest convergence encompasses an initial stage of 
deliberately listening to those who have been silent and then 
constructing dialogue among those who have not enjoyed productive 
exchange of views.  When it is consciously and optimally employed 
 
85 One of the worst-kept secrets is the rampant mistrust between and among minority 
communities and their organizations when forming coalitions.  See NEW AMERICA MEDIA, 
DEEP DIVISIONS, SHARED DESTINY: A POLL OF BLACK, HISPANIC, AND ASIAN 
AMERICANS ON RACE RELATIONS (2007), http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view 
_article.html?article_id=28501933d0e5c5344b21f9640dc13754. 
86 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”). 
87 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23 (2006). 
88 See George H. Taylor, Racism as “The Nation’s Crucial Sin”: Theology and Derrick 
Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 277 (2004) (“Whites deal with racial issues by ultimately 
protecting their property right in Whiteness: they act not out of altruism or morality but in 
self-interest.”). 
89 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
90 Bell, Jr., supra note 86. 
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in anticipation of a series of developments, interest convergence is the 
opportunity for diverse Americans to head off in a new direction.  So 
long as it is understood and used as a transition, there is no reason to 
deny that everyone, including those in power, wants to improve their 
position relative to others and take greater advantage of available 
resources. 
For that reason, when my law students and I attend various 
community and public meetings to recruit new community partners 
for integrative bargaining, we engender a relational process that 
appeals to a wide variety of interests.  For some in the audience, the 
key consideration is a cost-benefit analysis, a cold calculation of 
saving money that taxpayers will otherwise have to waste on truants, 
push-outs, or juvenile delinquents.  But for others, the driving concern 
is the quality of K-12 education for their own children or, more 
generally, the negative impact of troubled youth and gangs on public 
health and safety.  For others, it is the noble dream of dignifying and 
redeeming every young life.  Whatever the initial motivation for 
joining the campaign, my students and I make it clear that our goal is 
not simply helping certain targeted racial groups (cultural diversity), 
but the all-embracing cause of public health and public safety 
(cultural justice). 
Thus, whether interest convergence is seen nobly, as a way to 
improve and develop the human family, or as one more tool to satisfy 
selfish, unmitigated greed, it is a starting point for integrative 
bargaining that honestly accounts for the human impulse to get more 
return from the effort we currently expend.91 
B.  The Ecology of Cultural Justice: “What More Is at Stake?” 
In the K-12 clinical intervention, my students and I do not listen 
just for the easiest, fastest way to settle the immediate dispute over a 
child’s suspension, expulsion, or placement in a juvenile detention 
facility.  Instead, we ask, “What more is at stake?”  This second stage 
of integrative bargaining has forged a plan of action that solves 
problems not only as constructed in the immediate timeframe, but 
also with a view toward solving the trend or larger pattern of 
 
91 See Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 271 (2003) 
(Professor Craver has long taught that we should expect parties to act opportunistically, 
looking to exploit perceived advantages in bargaining power, skills, timing, and so on.  
The better we understand and account for the psychology of the negotiator’s starting point, 
the more room we create to negotiate better outcomes for all parties.). 
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problems in the short- and long-term.  Beyond deriving a satisfactory 
substantive settlement on the presenting issue, the community also 
strives to sustain the development of relational process by making 
sure that we learn from the present issue how to treat a cluster of 
related concerns.  In short, my students and I used integrative 
bargaining to deal with immediate, obvious issues—truancy 
remediation and reform of juvenile-detention practices—to teach 
affected parties how to prepare for even greater difficulties in the 
short- and long-term. 
An example of the second stage of integrative bargaining involves 
a community’s investigation of chronic, systemic conditions giving 
rise to episodes of truancy and juvenile delinquency.  The immediate 
problem appeared to be nothing more than isolated cases of 
absenteeism, with a number of these cases resulting in placement in a 
juvenile detention facility.92  But no sooner did the parties try to “fix” 
the problem with, for example, new school schedules, alarm clocks, 
and written contracts than they saw how truancy is often connected to 
deeper issues, namely a child’s fear of both being physically assaulted 
at school and racial isolation and self-segregation in the form of 
cliques, gangs, drug use, curfew violations, and other juvenile status 
offenses.93 
To solve for this pattern in the short-term, the community came 
together and decided to experiment.94  My students and I, in 
partnership with the regional public university, appealed to a 
countywide organization dedicated to dispute resolution to arrange for 
an event that would impress upon high-risk students their need to 
accept responsibility in creating a spirit of inclusion at school and in 
society.  To this end, Challenge Day was invited to stage its one-day 
 
92 See David Dominguez, Equal Justice from a New Perspective: The Need for a First-
Year Clinical Course on Public Interest Mediation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 995, 998–1001 
(2006) (describing truancy intervention in the Provo School District, Provo, Utah). 
93 See id. at 1009. 
94 Notably, the Provo City Police Department has been very supportive of a broad-based 
community effort including the business and educational sectors, explaining: 
[Solving such problems as truancy and gangs] involves everyone. 
. . . . 
. . . I have seen the racial tensions in school.  There needs to be a way of 
educating kids to be tolerant of other people and if there is a serious problem that 
cannot be tolerated, the students need to know how to resolve their conflicts 
without resorting to violence. 
Letter from Chet Whatcott, Police Officer, Provo City Police Dep’t (on file with author). 
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program for the entire student body at an alternative high school, but, 
instead of the customary one-day effort, Challenge Day was extended 
to three “Challenge Days” so that all the teenagers could participate.  
Our message to these high school students was not limited to the 
hardship faced by certain students of particular racial classifications 
who were struggling with isolation and discriminatory practices.  
Instead, our message was that they were all needed to incubate the 
ecology of cultural justice among all students. 
Challenge Day opened the eyes of the students to see that they 
were all responsible for group accountability and group recognition.  
They possessed the power to end bullying, belittling, isolation, and 
any other injurious behavior that makes life at school unsafe and 
unwelcoming.  The event resulted in healing and transformation 
among three hundred high school students, which comprised the 
entire student body.  These young people forgave, asked to be 
forgiven, and resolved to create healthy, inclusive, and life-affirming 
interactions at school. 
To solve for this pattern in the long-term, my students and I turned 
our eyes to an untapped resource for growing the ecology of cultural 
justice among all children at risk: the detention staff at the juvenile 
correctional center.  For over three years, I have led teams of law 
students into the juvenile jailhouse to correct the improper and 
inordinate use of detention for preadjudicated youth.  Our goal, as far 
as micro application, has been to intervene in specific cases with the 
intention of reporting our experiences to each other, interested parties, 
and public audiences, and thereby engage the community in a new 
effort to improve the public policy and institutional decision making 
that governs juvenile detention practices.  For example, when does it 
make sense, legally and practically, to lock up a child based on 
accusations of low-level juvenile status offenses and minor juvenile 
infractions—e.g., truancy, smoking, curfew violations, loud music, or 
pushing and shoving at school?95 
 
95 For a full account of this clinical effort, see David Dominguez, Community 
Lawyering in the Juvenile Cellblock: Creative Uses of Legal Problem Solving to Reconcile 
Competing Narratives on Prosecutorial Abuse, Juvenile Criminality, and Public Safety, 
2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 387 (2007).  The clinic has achieved appropriate short-term 
outcomes in particular situations, helping specific kids and their families with their legal 
cases in the detention phase of the juvenile justice system.  Law students have helped 
detention judges vindicate the U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and state codes 
and statutes that govern detention practice and policy—e.g., legal protections of children’s 
liberty interests and parents’ custodial rights.  See id. at 395–96. 
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At the macro level, our long-term objective has been to improve 
public policy and institutional decision making concerning detention 
practices.  To this end, my students and I are training detention staff 
to make the most of their professional role before, during, and after 
detention hearings.  We are helping them pursue needed structural 
reform that ensures appropriate use of, and legal justification for, 
extended stays in secure confinement. 
As was true for the intense interactive sessions of Challenge Day, 
we too use a mix of large group presentations, called “Youth and the 
Law” seminars, with small group discussions on how detainees can 
help each other advocate for their release.  These children in 
detention, representing all races, but predominately poor and 
disproportionately Latino, learn that unless they work together to 
develop the best case for release and reentry into family and school, 
they will be unlikely to make the most of their time in detention or 
before the judge.  This very practical lesson in collaboration among 
diverse children instills the lasting importance of reaching across the 
cultural divide to succeed in America—the same message of 
Challenge Day.96 
With regard to interest convergence, the detention staff sees this 
new, collaborative approach as furthering institutional interests in 
maintaining order, control, and safety.  To this end, during the large 
and small group activities, staff members deeply impress upon 
residents the importance of following rules, respecting persons and 
property, etc.  For the children, greater attention and sustained 
engagement by staff means that the staff is accountable for informed 
recommendations to the detention judge on whether a detainee is 
making progress on the unit and demonstrating suitability for release. 
The ambitious goal of this partnership is to legally empower 
detention staff to eliminate unnecessary stays in detention by 
immediately resolving minor, front-end cases through nonjudicial 
closure, without the need for an official detention hearing.  Staff 
would be given discretion to release certain detainees based in part on 
certification of the child’s satisfactory participation in the large group 
presentation and small group activities.  In harder cases, staff would, 
at minimum, be included in the disposition of the matter and asked for 
 
96 Thus, as a strategy for pursuing integration of the issues (“What more is at stake?”), 
Challenge Day has given rise to Challenge Year (short-term developments, such as direct 
services to children in detention) and planning for Challenge Decade (long-range 
reconstruction of the role of detention staff at the juvenile detention facility). 
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their input on whether a particular placement or diversionary program 
would be a good fit for a particular resident. 
The goal of our collaboration, therefore, is both to serve residents 
(the micro application) and to engage in systemic reform by 
capitalizing on the problem-solving resource of detention staff, 
encouraging them to use their 24/7 access to residents as a key 
resource in affording legal due process throughout the system (the 
macro application). 
C.  The Ecology of Cultural Justice: Activist Storytelling and Public 
Interest Mediation 
I have argued that the treatment of race issues must serve as a 
training ground to prepare Americans for even more difficult, 
pervasive public concerns.  With this in mind, our emerging 
partnerships with detention staff are not restricted to collaboration on 
providing legal due process for all detainees.  Rather, our focus is 
gearing up to address a matter of even graver concern nationwide: the 
juvenile justice system is becoming so much like the adult criminal 
justice system that it is losing its justification as a separate entity.  
Growing numbers of youth, some who are only fourteen, are waived 
into adult criminal court, and the judge has limited discretion as to 
whether that is in the best interest of the child.97  Other youth, as 
young as five, are getting arrested at school and placed in detention, 
in accordance with mandatory school rules, for carrying water squirt 
guns or scratching words on their desks.98  As counterproductive as 
those policies are, the worst part is that, while more children are being 
apprehended and punished as though they are in mature command of 
what is right and wrong, they are not provided bail, trial by jury, and 
 
97 See Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice:  Resolving Border Disputes, 
18 FUTURE CHILD. 81, 83, 87 tbl.2 (2008), available at http://futureofchildren.org/ 
futureofchildren/publications/docs/18_02_05.pdf.  In states, such as Utah, where there is a 
Serious Youth Offender Act, the law eliminates judicial discretion altogether in certain 
circumstances and requires that the accused youth offender be placed in the adult system 
for trial and punishment if charged with very serious criminal conduct.  UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-6-702 (West 2009).  A current Utah case is challenging the constitutionality of the 
Serious Youth Offender Act as a fundamental denial of legal due process, basically 
denying the child the opportunity to demonstrate the unfairness of being placed in the 
adult criminal justice system.  See Stephen Hunt, Teen Murder Suspect Can Be Tried as 
Adult, Judge Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 15, 2009, available at http://www.sltrib.com/ 
news/ci_12595714?source=rss. 
98 David Goodman, Hard Time Out, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2008, at 59, available 
at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/07/hard-time-out. 
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other protections afforded to adults under the U.S. Constitution.  
Plainly, the evaporating boundary between adult criminal court and 
juvenile justice results in the children getting the worst of both 
worlds.  This is a matter deserving activist storytelling and public 
interest mediation before the widest audience. 
And who better to broadcast that story than those most affected, 
school children in general and youth of color in particular?  The most 
ambitious aim of our partnership with detention staff is that detainees 
see themselves cast in a new role as peer teachers while in detention 
and then, upon returning to school, will prove they are promoting 
integration through group accountability.  For example, with 
cooperation from school administration, detainees will be expected to 
reenact sections of the large group “Youth and Law” presentation, the 
small group activity that they helped conduct while in detention, or 
both.  To increase the incentive for the returning student to satisfy 
these expectations, there would be a provision that pending charges 
will either be dismissed altogether, held in abeyance, or classified in 
less severe posture—e.g., the charge would be dismissed altogether or 
reduced, pending completion of probation.  In effect, detainees would 
be offered a new sentencing matrix that is dependent on how well 
they learn their group-accountability lessons in detention and fulfill 
the “back-at-school” component of their probation conditions. 
The demand of this new public campaign cannot be stated strongly 
enough: the boundary between the adult and the juvenile justice 
systems must be restored.  Children must be given a second chance 
whenever possible.  While adults spend time in jail as punishment for 
their crime, children must be able to use their time in detention not 
only to “do the time,” but also to develop both new training and skills 
in integrative practices and new competency regarding positive 
collaboration—i.e., the very purpose of a separate juvenile justice 
system.  As concerned activists avail themselves of all resources in 
this campaign to restore the proper boundary, among the principal 
advocates must be the children themselves, notably children of color. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article reflects an American parable where the professional—
negotiation theory and the law governing race and race relations—
meets the personal—the post-Brown narrative arc of my life.  
Combining the two, I have offered a grand strategy for reformatting 
affirmative action: a strategy combining integrative bargaining in 
general and the merits of the process/substance distinction in 
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particular.  For affirmative action to be legally and politically viable, 
it must be race-neutral, admitting and training law students from all 
backgrounds.  It must provide law school clinical courses in 
integrationist studies and practices that teach students how to 
negotiate among culturally diverse parties to reach substantive goals 
while also growing in relational understanding and appreciation of 
pluralism in America. 
Yet most law schools are in denial and refuse to accept the 
impending legal reality that affirmative action must be race-neutral by 
2028.  Too many actors in legal education are hoping that, in the next 
twenty years, the “plus factor” rationale of Bakke will somehow 
regain vitality through the appointment of new Justices to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  This is wishful thinking.  It is better for law schools 
to accept the legal, political, and social reality that race preference is 
coming to an end.  Doing so will force law teachers to pursue a 
twenty-first century curriculum that turns cultural diversity from static 
numbers of minority students sitting in classrooms into the interactive 
ecology of cultural justice.  America needs an educational policy that 
meets head-on the impending legal deadline on affirmative action as 
we know it.  More than teaching abstract law on desegregation, law 
schools must offer clinical courses that train students from all 
backgrounds to build an inclusive, integrated American society. 
I have tried to show how important it is for law schools to stop 
taking sides in the end/defend debate and instead choose to extend 
affirmative action to all applicants who are ready and willing to 
complete law school clinical courses in integrationist studies and 
practice.  Specifically, I have explained how my students have tested 
this approach to affirmative action in relation to school truancy 
policies and juvenile detention practices.  My students and I have 
motivated parties, often erstwhile strangers, to collaborate in their 
care for all youth.  The welfare of children has presented an 
opportunity where all parties’ needs and concerns converge, and, thus, 
a new dialogue and exploration of agreements occurs that leaves 
everyone better off. 
But this Article is more than a thought piece on racial inclusion; it 
is a call for immediate action in legal education.  Legal educators, law 
students, and all others concerned with the future of affirmative action 
dare not dither as we compare macro theories or grand constructs.  
We need to get busy, stepping up our commitment to engage law 
students in thousands of mini-exchanges as multicultural Americans.  
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We need to increase their availability to each other in clinical courses, 
not just develop more academic strategies. 
And it is urgent that we do so.  There is not much time left to 
design a race-neutral approach to affirmative action that is acceptable 
to the Constitution and the nation as a whole.  As Justice O’Connor 
stated in Grutter, “We take the Law School at its word that it would 
‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ 
and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable.”99 
Indeed, students of all ages, especially children, deserve the best 
education we can give toward improving race relations in America.  
They deserve a learning environment with a pervasive commitment to 
integrationist studies and practice, one that is keenly aware of the 
need in the twenty-first century to reach across cultural divides.  K-12 
and higher education must teach the next generation the real story and 
interpersonal skills to craft the most inclusive possible version of the 
post-Brown narrative. 
Are we proceeding with all deliberate speed? 
 
 
 
99 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
